A new report from the Council on Foreign Relations website indicates an overwhleming amount of public support for Abu Mazen’s call for a referendum in order to resurrect negotiations to reach a two state solution for the Palestinian people.  Over the past several months, I have met with a number of highly respected veterans of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiating theatre on different occasions, and the only consensus  view that I came away with is hat prospects for negotiation of a viable two-state solution over the near term are zero.

This interview with Ziad Asali by Bernard Gwertzman, which I have excerpted below and to which you can link by clicking here, suggests that the power of Palestinian public opinion in support of Abu Mazen’s bold call for negotiation may succeed in shifting momentum to the negotiating table a lot sooner than many seasoned experts believe.

We can always hope, and we should applaud the constructive leadership shown by Abu Mazen when everyone outside of Israel and Palestine seems to have written him off.

Asali: Palestinians Support Abbas’ Referendum Plan by Huge Majority

Interviewee:  Ziad J. Asali

Interviewer:  Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor

June 2, 2006

Ziad J. Asali, president and founder of the American Task Force on Palestine, a group dedicated to setting up a state of Palestine alongside that of Israel, says that the call two weeks ago by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas for a referendum by Palestinians on whether to proceed with negotiations for a two-state solution with Israel has energized many Palestinians who had earlier believed he was too weak. "To have someone say ‘enough of all this and let’s just get a resolution of this issue,’ and to have someone in charge, is, I’m sure, a welcome change for the Palestinians right now," says Asali, a Palestinian born in Jerusalem, who has a medical degree.

He says that according to two reputable polls recently taken in the Palestinian territories, some 75 to 80 percent of those polled support the referendum idea, which is opposed by the Hamas-led government of the Palestine Authority, which is independent of President Abbas. "The people just want an end to this disastrous way of life. The Palestinians cannot see a way out of the present predicament other than by the two-state solution," he says.

…

Of course you have, in the current Israeli coalition government, a difference of opinion because Olmert’s own defense minister, Amir Peretz, head of the Labor Party, is very interested in negotiating. I think a lot will depend on whether or not this referendum can actually get off the ground. I suppose he’ll need some Arab support for this.

He has the Arab support. He has international support for it, and I think it has already made a difference, whether it takes place or not. You know it can be challenged, of course. Any government, and even any party that has armed people, could impose its will on them, could disrupt this process, so Hamas is in a position to disrupt it physically if it wants to, but it has to calculate its moves very carefully if the Palestinians in fact do support it by a majority of 80%, which is what we’re seeing now.

Have polls been taken?

Yes, reputable polls. Up to now around 80 percent support the referendum. Two polls actually have already published.

And it’s 80 percent?

Yes, one was. I think both of them are 75 to 80 percent. There actually is no surprise in the Palestinian people’s support for a two-state solution. Poll after poll after poll since the Oslo agreements has shown around 65 to 70 percent support for a two-state solution. I wasn’t surprised that this would go up to 80 percent now, especially after the economic hardship of the past several months. The people just want an end to this disastrous way of life. The Palestinians cannot see a way out of the present predicament other than by the two-state solution. Their main concern, actually, is the other one, which is, is it too late for a state? They would be very willing to have a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with East Jerusalem.

Of course if they do have negotiations it would be extremely difficult, I would think.

Well, of course it would be very difficult because there are three situations here that Israel finds objectionable. One is the fact that the question of refugees as stated in the prisoners’ list of terms for negotiations was to be solved on the basis of the right of return. This is something that Israel would not accept. The borders as mentioned here in this document were the pre-1967 war borders. Of course this is something else that Israel would not quite readily accept either, and there is no mentioning of the recognition of the State of Israel that Israel wants out of Hamas. So these are things that Israel would not go along with readily, shall we say. There will be hard negotiations. But, you know, it gets us back at least to moving on beyond Camp David [talks that failed in 2000] and Taba [failed talks in Egypt in January 2001]. So of course they will have differences, but at least we’re talking about things that can conceivably be bridged by negotiations.

The debate over the efficacy and desirability of promoting democracy and "freedom" in the Middle East rages on.  The cover graphic and lead story of the February 4th-10th 2006 edition of The Economist asserts that the Bush administration’s unbridled advocacy for the establishment of democratic political institutions in the Middle East is "the one thing Bush got right".  In contrast, in an article in the September/October 2005 edition of Foreign Affairs, Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?, F.Gregory Gause III asserts precisely the opposite position.

Whereas The Economist article takes a "big picture" approach to why democracy is a good thing for the Middle East, the article in Foreign Affairs takes a pragmatic approach and argues that the stated goals of the U.S.– improved U.S. security– will not be well-served or enhanced by promoting democracy in the Middle East.

From The Economist:

"Mr. Bush has made many big mistakes in the Middle East.  They range from inept planning and follow-through in Iraq to supine neglect of Palestine.  But his democratisation policy is not one of them.  In fact, it may be the the one big thing that this president has got right in the region. . .. Holding elections is not a panacea.  Democracy cannot at a stroke heal national conflicts, create civic institutions or modernise traditional societies.  But whatever else people think of Mr. Bush, on this one thing– the universal potential and appeal of the democratic idea– he is on the side of history."

From Foreign Affairs:

"The Bush administration contends that the push for democracy in the Muslim world will improve U.S. security.  But this premise is faulty: there is no evidence that democracy reduces terrorism.  Indeed, a democratic Middle East would probably result in Islamist governments unwilling to cooperate with Washington. …The problem with promoting democracy in the Arab world is not that Arabs do not like democracy; it is that Washington probably would not like the governments Arab democracy would produce.  Assuming that democratic Arab governments would better represent the opinions of their people than do the current Arab regimes, democratization of the Arab world should produce more anti-U.S. foreign policies."

I remember studying this phenomenon in my undergraduate days at Harvard with Professor Samuel P. Huntington, who was also my thesis advisor.  At the time, his book "Political Order in Changing Societies" was the ruling treatise on this subject.  While Professor Hutington has added a great deal to the body of academic work on this subject over the past 25 years, most recently with his work on the clash of civilizations in a multi-polar world, the basic premise that he developed in "Political Order in Changing Societies" still holds.  Countries with weak political infrastructures and a history of weak or suppressed oppositions– particularly those with histories of strong authoritarian/dictatorial regimes (such as in South America) — ususally only transition to democracy in a very messy way and over a long period of time.

The Bush administration’s attempt to accelerate the pace of socio-political change in the Middle East without letting the cake bake sufficiently is clearly profoundly destabilizing for individual countries and carries ominous implications for regional instability.  Over the short term, these power transitions empower precisely the fundamentalist groups that are most inimical to the interest to the United States.

Why?  Because fanatical religious organizations also tend to have strong organizational infrastructures– through the strength of the mosques, the uniform curriculum of the madrassas, and, in the case of an organization like Hamas, the proven ability to deliver social services to citizens at a local level in the face of corrupt ruling elites.   

From the Foreign Affairs article–

"The trend is clear: Islamists of various hues score well in free elections.  In countries where a governing party dominates or where the king opposes political Islam, Islamists run second and form the opposition.  Only in Morocco, where more secular, leftists parties have a long history and an established presence, and in Lebanon, where the Christian-Muslim dynamic determines electoral politics, did organized non-Islamist political blocs, independent of the government, compete with Islamist forces.  The pattern does not look like it is about to change.  … The more democratic the Arab world gets, the more likely it is that Islamists will come to power.  Even if those Islamists come to accept the rules of democracy and reject political violence, they are unlikely to support U.S. foreign policy goals in the region."

The Economist hedges its wholesale endorsement of notional democracy by stating that  "in time, the realists may be proved right.  An Arab country might one day vote in an al-Qaeda government and make war on America.  But where is their evidence?  Having attempted an insurrection in Saudi Arabia, al-Qaeda is growing less popular there.  Iraq under the dictator was neither at peace nor friendly to the West; the present haggling between elected parties may be the only realistic way to bind a fissiparous country together."

I find the following view from Foreign Affairs more convincing:

"Washington must realize that its democratization policy will lead to Islamist domination of Arab politics.  It is not only the focus on elections that is troubling in the administration’s democracy initiative in the Arab world.  Also problematic is the unjustified confidence that Washington has in its ability to predict, and even direct, the course of politics in other countries."

I have no problem with the U.S. trying to influence other countries to pursue policies that benefit the U.S.  I do have a problem with this country not doing so efffectively, especially when the history of U.S. foreign policy suggests, time and again, that we fail to support the right oppositions and  are naive if not culturally insensitive in our approaches.  I also don’t think we can afford to see the realists proven right "in time"–  we need to get it right, now!

So what should be done instead?  Gause suggests the following tactics–

"The United States must focus on pushing Arab governments to make political space for liberal, secular, leftist, nationalist, and other non-Islamist parties to set down roots and mobilize voters.  Washington should support those groups that are more likely to accept U.S. foreign policy and emulate U.S. political values.  The most effective way to demonstrate that support is to openly pressure Arab regimes when they obstruct the political activity of more liberal groups . . . But Washington will also need to drop its focus on prompt elections in Arab countries where no strong, organized alternative to Islamist parties exists– even at the risk of disappointing Arab liberals by being more cautious about their electoral prospects than they are."