VCs Need to Focus on How the Jockey Rides the Horse




Horse_and_jockey Last week in PE Hub Dan Primack reported on a recent white paper, “Should Investors Bet on the Jockey or the Horse? Evidence from the Evolution of Firms from Early Business Plans to Public Companies”.  In this paper, Professors Steven N. Kaplan (University of Chicago), Berk A. Sensoy (USC), and Per Stromberg (Stockholm Institute of Financial Research) survey 50 VC-backed companies that completed IPO’s in 2004.  They conclude the following:

“The results call into question the claim that “a great management team can find a good opportunity even if they have to make a huge leap from the market they currently occupy. . . . firms that go public rarely change or make a huge leap from their initial business idea or line of business.  An initial strong business, therefore, may not be sufficient, but appears to be almost necessary for a company to succeed.  On the other hand, it is common for firms to replace their founders and initial managers with new ones and still be able to go public, suggesting that VCs are regularly able to find management replacements or improvements for good businesses.  We interpret our results as indicating that, on the margin, VCs should spend more time on due diligence of the business rather than management.”

The authors wisely note the limitations of their small sample size and that 44% of the companies in their survey were life sciences companies.  They also point out that they are unable to access data on companies that experienced exits through acquisition (the vast majority of VC-backed companies) because this data is unavailable.  It is unfortunate that the value of much of the academic research conducted on our field is severely limited by the lack of access to relevant data.  This is clearly the case when one reflects on the conclusions of this report.  In my view, debating this aspect of the Horse vs. Jockey argument isn’t particularly useful to VCs or to entrepreneurs.

A more interesting line of related questions could begin with “Why do so few VC-backed firms succeed, period?”  "Is it endemic to venture capital investing that roughly 10% of investments will account for the vast majority of returns?"  "Can VCs do something to improve these statistics and therefore increase the return profile of the entire industry?" 

As the authors point out, VCs do, indeed, know how to replace management teams, and this occurs quite regularly.  More importantly, the human capital side of founder and management transitions is by no means optimized in our industry. In my opinion, the absence of consistent processes in many VC-company management transitions is the Achilles heel that spells failure for many companies—and this suggests that dysfunctional personal dynamics between VCs and founders may actually lead companies with solid business models to fail.

Start-ups experience accelerating rates of change, both internally and externally, as they develop.  The convergence of changing markets, evolving product lines, and frequent employee hires and replacements in a resource-constrained environment leads to extraordinary and stress inducing rapid rates of change in fledgling companies.

Through collaborative work on identifying governance best practices, the group of VCs and other industry professionals who have formed the Working Group on Director Accountability and Board Effectiveness conclude that having process and internal controls in place allows investors and the senior management team to better identify and calibrate problems, to determine the next course of action, and to reposition the company for success.  The outcome may involve changes to the team, to the business model, or both.

Process and controls form an important framework for management self-help in decision making.  Without process, it’s much easier to flounder and get caught in sub-optimal decisionmaking.

While VCs should certainly avoid investing in weak business models, in contrast to Professors Kaplan, Sensoy, and Stromberg, I would suggest that, at the margin, we should spend more time identifying and applying best practices and processes to our companies to improve our set of potential outcomes.  Assuming that we can identify strong business models, we should focus on maximizing the potential for our management teams to succeed in order to boost the VC industry’s collective returns for our investors. 

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2 Responses to “VCs Need to Focus on How the Jockey Rides the Horse”

  1. Hugh Goldie Says:

    When a SME CEO’s Hits a Ceiling, What Can You Do about It
    Complexity is a function of the time span for which decisions must be made, the magnitude of the issues being addressed, and the number of variables to be managed. I’ve observed that revenue levels of $five million, $ten million, $25 million, $50 million, and $100 million present plateaus where the level of complexity changes enough to require a change in management capacity. Some CEOs can break through those levels. Many can’t.
    In one situation, the CEO, after ten years of 30% growth rates, hit the $100 million ceiling. The task of convincing him he should find a replacement took a year. Once he was convinced that a new CEO was required, the company took off once again. Everybody won.
    To manage complexity requires the CEO to create clarity from a confusing mass of issues and problems. It then requires conceiving a strategy that is seen as being achievable by those who are must meet for its goals.
    The ability to extract clarity and simplicity from confusion is not a universal talent. Most can manage at low levels. Fewer can manage as the company grows and the level of complexity increases.
    Concerns for the CEO’s ability to manage complexity are not revealed to the Board in a blinding flash. Nor does the CEO recognize his/her limitations in a blinding flash. They come over time, as the CEO is observed to be having difficulty in seeing through the fog of problems, or developing a new plan. The CEO may not recognize the problem, but will show their frustration.
    No director wants to be seen as unfairly questioning the competence of the CEO. But if the CEO is slipping and the problem is allowed to grow, salvaging the situation could become ugly.
    Helping the CEO, who is often the majority shareholder, to recognize that he/she is no longer able to lead the company, requires tact, time, and clear evidence to demonstrate the reality of the situation.
    The following is a précis from my book, “Confidence in the Board Room. How Directors Manage Risk and Deliver Superior Governance.”
    Hugh Goldie http://www.govtools.blogspot.com/ http://www.GovernanceTools.com

  2. Pascal Levensohn Says:

    Thanks for this observation. Non-VC-backed companies do, indeed,face a different board dynamic when the CEO is often the majority shareholder. It is always a challenge to know when it is time for a change- most VC’s will say that they never made a CEO-change too soon. This challenge is made even greater when the person being replaced controls the votes to make it happen. Knowing your own limitations, especially when you are a hard-driving entrepreneur, requires a degree of self-awareness that few people possess. In these cases, working with an outside consultant on board governance and management issues as a matter of general good practice well before these issues arise can facilitate the self-awareness of the control shareholder CEO.

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