I recently chaired a panel at the Stevens Institute of Technology cybersecurity conference in Washington D.C. and was asked by the conference organizers to develop an agenda based on a review of pending Senate Bill 773, the “Cybersecurity Act of 2009″. Our panel, which included two security experts– former National Security Agency Deputy Director Bill Crowell and Ted Schlein of KPCB, focused on some of the challenges to the passage of effective legislative solutions aimed at securing data on the Internet. The point of departure for our panel was a consideration of two specific sections of Senate Bill 773.
The summary of the Bill’s purpose highlights the importance of the continued free flow of commerce, the need for secure cyber communications on the Internet, and a defensive approach to prevent disruption to these activities.
Three focal themes emerged from the discussion:
I That the implementation of effective international standards of cooperation to achieve cybersecurity is going to be more difficult to achieve and is far more complex than it appears. Google’s unfolding experience in China is only the latest manifestation of the complexity of this issue.
II That developing a new legislative protocol for the dissemination of cybersecurity threat information to the public is going to be very difficult and is likely to lead to unintended consequences. While one government organization may be designated as responsible for this delicate role, many others will continue to lay claim to ultimate authority over what is or is not classified information in the cyber realm.
III That legislative approaches to cybersecurity need to more fully recognize that promoting healthy and robust U.S. capital markets is essential to our nation’s economic and national security.
The globally integrative power of the Internet brings with it major challenges when it comes to international cooperation. This is especially the case when the economic competition between nation states is increasing and different players approach the same playing field with completely different rules as to what constitutes fair play. Bill 773 designates the President to develop norms, organizations, and other cooperative activities for international engagement to improve cybersecurity.

What do we mean by different approaches to economic competition? McAfee recently released its fifth annual Virtual Criminology Report, concluding that politically motivated cyber attacks have increased in a number of countries, including the United States. There is a clear tension between the desire and need for international cooperation and setting standards in cybersecurity and the reality that cyber attacks are now a tool of governments.
Bill Crowell was quoted in that report as saying that “Over the next 20 to 30 years, cyber-attacks will increasingly become a component of war,” “What I can’t foresee is whether networks will be so pervasive and unprotected that cyber war operations will stand alone.”
In section 14, Bill 773 designates the Department of Commerce as the clearinghouse of cybersecurity threat and vulnerability information to the Federal government and the Private sector. The protection of our nation’s critical infrastructure is a matter of both economic and national security. This is also probably one of the most sensitive “political turf” battle issues in the United States. The Department of Defense, the NSA, various military branches, and the intelligence community all lay claim in various ways to a piece of the cybersecurity pie. Nobody will argue that a breach of our nation’s cybersecurity impacts commerce. Can you explain why the Department of Commerce has been designated to serve as the clearinghouse of cybersecurity threat and vulnerability information to Federal Government and private sector owned critical infrastructure information systems and networks, and how do you believe this is actually going to work in terms of coordinating with the military? What happens when someone invokes making threat data classified as a matter of national security—aren’t we already living in ignorance of a lot of threat information precisely because of this problem?
Click here for a link to the full panel broadcast, which was broadcast on C-Span.
Startups, the engine of American innovation and an important source of job growth nationally, took a severe beating in 2009 because so few were funded by the venture community. While the freedom to fail remains a given among emerging companies, a creeping risk aversion among investors inhibiting new capital formation for long-term, illiquid investments threatens an entire generation of American entrepreneurs.
About two-thirds of CEOs who initially take the top job at a startup are eventually replaced, but many venture capitalists approach the likelihood of management change as an afterthought, even though driving an orderly process for management succession represents the venture capitalist’s most important role as a corporate director. Much of the explanation for this surprisingly common problem can be traced to misaligned interests between the board and the CEO, a situationthat is only aggravated by stressful economic times.
I believe venture capitalists and CEOs must put their differences aside so that these startups can survive and ultimately thrive. Among the reasons for the differences of approach to managing CEO change among venture investors is that early-stage players often forge a strong personal, as well as business relationship, with the CEO. This relationship is often absent among later-round venture investors. And the issue of equity dilution, always high on the CEO’s agenda, often clashes with the agenda of all venture backers. Things get even hotter when a startup fails to meet projections, requiring more capital than originally anticipated, an all-too-common scenario today.




Friday’s
Decimalization, quoting stock prices in decimals instead of fractions, isn’t a problem in and of itself. The problem results from turning a market spread that used to be $0.25, for example, into 25 1-penny increments because it takes the positive economics out of trading that stock for market makers who are supporting relatively unknown emerging growth small cap companies. Why does this matter? Because if you can’t make money risking your capital by providing liquidity for others, you won’t. This change to decimalization occurred in 2001. Combined with New Order Handling rules originally passed in September 1996 and implemented in 1997, these modifications to technical trading rules fundamentally changed how then-emerging electronic trading networks (ECN’s), such as Instinet, could buy and and sell stocks. In short, ECN’s could transact within the market maker’s spread and force the market maker to execute at the ECN’s order price. The problem with this, again, is that it caused market makers to lose money, so they stopped marking markets in stocks where they would lose money. Simple enough, but the unintended consequences of well-intended regulations have had the severely negative impact on our economy of gutting liquidity and research support for small cap stocks. As a result, small companies that are otherwise worthy of going public cannot access the public markets because they cannot support a large enough underwriting to attract large cap investors. This is why the underwriting criteria for IPOs today require companies to have $100mm plus in revenues, have a multi-year history of positive cashflow generation, and be profitable on a GAAP basis, at a minimum, in order to raise sufficient capital to generate sufficient after-market liquidity for underwriters to take on the new listing. The losers are the next generation of innovative companies and the entrepreneurs who lead them– today’s version of Intel, Dell, EA, Applied Materials, Symantec, Oracle, and many other well-known companies who could not meet today’s IPO criteria but did successfully go public and grow into industry giants through IPO’s completed before 1997. Watch this Bloomberg TV video, featuring David Weild, which tells the story. 



